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\n Cichano\u016dskaja’s positive coverage<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nSince 2020, the Center for New Ideas has monitored Western media to analyze coverage of Belarusian politicians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the last three years, Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka, who was declared the winner in Belarus\u2019 tumultuous presidential election in August 2020, has received much more extensive coverage than his chief rival Cichano\u016dskaja, who disputed the official result and was forced to flee the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In 2022, the coverage gap between the two politicians widened as \u0141uka\u0161enka attracted international criticism for helping Russia invade Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While \u0141uka\u0161enka draws mostly negative coverage, Cichano\u016dskaja has been mentioned less often, but only in a positive way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
She is usually referred to as “a leading Belarusian opposition figure” or “the national leader of Belarus” and less often as the elected president.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In 2022, Cichano\u016dskaja was also described a \u201chuman rights activist\u201d or \u201copposition activist,\u201d even though she is still predominantly seen as the country\u2019s opposition leader.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In 325 articles concerning Belarus run by the NYT<\/em> between mid-2022 and mid-2023, the paper mentioned Cichano\u016dskaja only 18 times, describing her as \u201cthe leader of democratic forces.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe NYT<\/em> article dated August 7 coined the term \u201cself-styled leader,\u201d which somewhat downgrades her status.<\/p>\n\n\n\nOpposition locked out of negotiations on political prisoners<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nIn a recent prisoner exchange between Russia and the West, 16 people were released, including Russian political prisoners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Rico Krieger, a German man sentenced to death in Belarus, was also part of the deal. The swap brought the issue of Belarusian political prisoners into the spotlight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Some say the opposition could have used international connections to make more progress toward the release of imprisoned Belarusian activists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While mainstream opposition politicians have maintained over the years that international ties are important for rallying support for civil society and democratization, political prisoners remain behind bars.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The West does not have an \u201cexchange pool\u201d of prisoners whose release would be of interest to the Belarusian regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The release of Russian political prisoners raised the question why Belarusian prisoners were not considered for the exchange.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The exiled opposition leaders do not have much influence on the regime and are expecting Western diplomats to push for the release of Belarus\u2019 prisoners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Belarusian pro-democracy leaders use their international influence to encourage Western diplomats to hold negotiations, but it is unclear what concessions exiled opponents can offer to the Belarusian government and whether they will be involved in the talks at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Questions about legitimacy<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nCichano\u016dskaja\u2019s legitimacy may be called into question after the 2025 presidential election in Belarus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Critics say that her mandate as the national leader runs out in 2025, while her associates insist that she must remain in this capacity until a fair election is held in the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the New Belarus 2024 conference in Vilnius on August 3-4, most opposition groups endorsed Cichano\u016dskaja as their leader until a fair election.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, at least one group criticized that approach as undemocratic, calling for an election within the opposition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On August 13, the Coordination Council\u2019s Bie\u0142arusy faction led by Andrej Jahora\u016d, Alaksandar Knyrovi\u010d and Vadzim Prakopje\u016d suggested that Cichano\u016dskaja hold an election for national leader in 2025 to reassert her authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The poll can sow discord within the opposition camp. The low turnout in May\u2019s election for the Coordination Council suggests that voters are losing interest in what the opposition is doing and are afraid to take election-associated risks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The longer opponents live in exile the more Belarusians may become frustrated with the opposition leader.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Rethinking approaches<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\nWestern partners support the Belarusian pro-democracy movement, but history is a reminder that this support cannot last for decades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While the international community knows that fighting authoritarianism is a long-term effort, interest in the Belarusian pro-democracy movement may decline over time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The 2025 election may be a turning point. Cichano\u016dskaja\u2019s international credentials might be enough to maintain momentum, but a big question mark is already hanging over her legitimacy after 2025, even if \u0141uka\u0161enka is denied international recognition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Many Belarusians would like Cichano\u016dskaja to continue representing their interests at the international level, but Western partners might be losing faith in her influence at home.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the other hand, if she becomes a peripheral figure, \u0141uka\u0161enka might be more willing to engage with the West on political prisoners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ending repression and asserting legitimacy require different strategies, and it is a challenge for the opposition to find its place in this chain of events.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Also read:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The NYT<\/em> article dated August 7 coined the term \u201cself-styled leader,\u201d which somewhat downgrades her status.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In a recent prisoner exchange between Russia and the West, 16 people were released, including Russian political prisoners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Rico Krieger, a German man sentenced to death in Belarus, was also part of the deal. The swap brought the issue of Belarusian political prisoners into the spotlight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Some say the opposition could have used international connections to make more progress toward the release of imprisoned Belarusian activists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While mainstream opposition politicians have maintained over the years that international ties are important for rallying support for civil society and democratization, political prisoners remain behind bars.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The West does not have an \u201cexchange pool\u201d of prisoners whose release would be of interest to the Belarusian regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The release of Russian political prisoners raised the question why Belarusian prisoners were not considered for the exchange.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The exiled opposition leaders do not have much influence on the regime and are expecting Western diplomats to push for the release of Belarus\u2019 prisoners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Belarusian pro-democracy leaders use their international influence to encourage Western diplomats to hold negotiations, but it is unclear what concessions exiled opponents can offer to the Belarusian government and whether they will be involved in the talks at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cichano\u016dskaja\u2019s legitimacy may be called into question after the 2025 presidential election in Belarus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Critics say that her mandate as the national leader runs out in 2025, while her associates insist that she must remain in this capacity until a fair election is held in the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the New Belarus 2024 conference in Vilnius on August 3-4, most opposition groups endorsed Cichano\u016dskaja as their leader until a fair election.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, at least one group criticized that approach as undemocratic, calling for an election within the opposition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On August 13, the Coordination Council\u2019s Bie\u0142arusy faction led by Andrej Jahora\u016d, Alaksandar Knyrovi\u010d and Vadzim Prakopje\u016d suggested that Cichano\u016dskaja hold an election for national leader in 2025 to reassert her authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The poll can sow discord within the opposition camp. The low turnout in May\u2019s election for the Coordination Council suggests that voters are losing interest in what the opposition is doing and are afraid to take election-associated risks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The longer opponents live in exile the more Belarusians may become frustrated with the opposition leader.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Western partners support the Belarusian pro-democracy movement, but history is a reminder that this support cannot last for decades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While the international community knows that fighting authoritarianism is a long-term effort, interest in the Belarusian pro-democracy movement may decline over time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 2025 election may be a turning point. Cichano\u016dskaja\u2019s international credentials might be enough to maintain momentum, but a big question mark is already hanging over her legitimacy after 2025, even if \u0141uka\u0161enka is denied international recognition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Many Belarusians would like Cichano\u016dskaja to continue representing their interests at the international level, but Western partners might be losing faith in her influence at home.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On the other hand, if she becomes a peripheral figure, \u0141uka\u0161enka might be more willing to engage with the West on political prisoners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ending repression and asserting legitimacy require different strategies, and it is a challenge for the opposition to find its place in this chain of events.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Also read:<\/p>\n\n\n\nOpposition locked out of negotiations on political prisoners<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Questions about legitimacy<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Rethinking approaches<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n