{"id":108223,"date":"2024-10-07T14:37:01","date_gmt":"2024-10-07T11:37:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/108223\/"},"modified":"2024-10-08T17:00:46","modified_gmt":"2024-10-08T14:00:46","slug":"crimea-donbas-trade-belarus-embraces-its-role-as-economic-outcast","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/108223\/","title":{"rendered":"Crimea, Donbas trade: Belarus embraces its role as economic outcast"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In recent months, Belarus has significantly increased trade with the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine. Minsk has not only acknowledged these ties but has also made them public.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n\n Crimea bridge\n <\/div>\n \n
\n (Rosavtodor \/ Wikimedia Commons)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Business with annexed territories<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The public acknowledgment of these relations suggests that economic gains are considered more important than the damage to Belarus’s international reputation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since 2020, Belarus\u2019s image has been severely tarnished by its brutal crackdown on protesters and its involvement in Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Given this backdrop, the government in Minsk seems to care little about further harming its reputation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belarus has been supplying goods to the occupied regions of eastern Ukraine for quite some time. On September 19, during a meeting with Denis Pushilin, leader of the self-proclaimed Donetsk republic, Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka confirmed these ties in a public display of acknowledgment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Two major Belarusian companies, MAZ and Amkodor, are reportedly considering setting up assembly plants in eastern Ukraine to manufacture trucks, buses and forestry machinery.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belarusian stores selling doors and furniture have also been operating in the region for some time, through Russian front companies. In addition, Belarus supplies food and alcohol to these territories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Russian-occupied Crimea, \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s Presidential Property Management Office oversees the Belorussia health resort, located in the coastal area of Miskhor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia has been working to attract Belarusian tourists to the peninsula. Prior to the annexation, traveling to Crimea was relatively easy, but now the journey takes around 38 hours by bus via Russia. Nonetheless, Belarusian operators continue offering tours, while officials are exploring ways to improve transport links.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belarus accepts its role as economic outcast<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The occupied regions of eastern Ukraine and Crimea are heavily reliant on Russian subsidies and are in dire need of rebuilding foreign economic ties. Trade with Belarus, therefore, serves a dual purpose: it not only bolsters the economy of these territories but also acts as a political statement, signaling that things are “back to normal.” What started as humanitarian aid has quickly evolved into regular trade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This collaboration could also become a political instrument for the Kremlin, helping to validate its narrative of Russian sovereignty over the occupied territories. Meanwhile, Western countries continue to avoid such interactions, imposing sanctions on those who violate international norms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For the occupied territories, foreign economic relations with Belarus are a means of escaping isolation. For Belarus, these ties only deepen its international isolation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belarus has a long history of building relationships with rogue states like Venezuela, Syria and North Korea. However, now it is engaging with annexed and unrecognized regions, further complicating its diplomatic position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

No other choice<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

After crushing the 2020 protests and allowing Russia to use Belarusian territory as a launch pad for its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Minsk has found itself increasingly isolated, with few options for maneuvering.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belarus\u2019s legal ties with the annexed territories were formalized at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2023. D\u017amitryj Krutoj, Belarus\u2019s ambassador to Russia at the time, signed cooperation agreements with Pushilin on agriculture and transportation\u2014an official step toward implementing the verbal agreements previously made between \u0141uka\u0161enka and officials from the occupied territories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belarus now faces a dilemma: on the one hand, these ties give access to the Russian financial support flowing into these regions; on the other hand, such partnerships risk further economic sanctions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Minsk has sought to reduce its dependence on Russia by expanding trade with China. However, this effort remains constrained by the fact that Belarusian trade with China relies heavily on Russian logistics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belarusian officials now face the challenge of attracting Chinese investments without alienating Russia. They will need to convince Beijing to push Moscow to allow Belarus to strengthen its economic ties with China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Economy requires political transformation<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The sanctions imposed on Belarus have forced the country to reorient its trade, which has had a significant impact on its foreign economic policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Instead of engaging in trade with neighboring countries, Belarus has resorted to “teaspoon-dose” trade with remote regions that may not even be familiar with Belarusian goods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, Belarusian exports are struggling, and the production of goods still depends on imported raw materials, many of which have become much more expensive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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