{"id":115967,"date":"2024-11-29T13:13:22","date_gmt":"2024-11-29T10:13:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/115967\/"},"modified":"2024-11-29T13:13:24","modified_gmt":"2024-11-29T10:13:24","slug":"lukasenkas-personnel-policy-mutual-dependence","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/115967\/","title":{"rendered":"\u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s personnel policy: mutual dependence"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka has assembled a team that is deeply loyal to him, but not necessarily skilled or professional.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n (pexels.com)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

U\u0142adzimir Makiej, who served as Belarus’s foreign minister for ten years, died suddenly two years ago. Known as the architect of a political thaw with the European Union, Makiej was, above all, a steadfast ally of \u0141uka\u0161enka. Whether advocating for policies friendly to the EU, such as making Belarus \u201cthe Switzerland of Eastern Europe,\u201d or supporting repressive measures against dissidents, Makiej proved equally diligent in advancing whatever agenda \u0141uka\u0161enka dictated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After the 2020 political unrest, a new era of “stooge officials” emerged in Belarus\u2014loyalists who followed \u0141uka\u0161enka’s directives without question, entrenched in key government positions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Loyalty over competence<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The large-scale purge that followed the 2020 political crisis was aimed at removing anyone \u0141uka\u0161enka deemed insufficiently loyal. Prime Minister Siarhiej Rumas was replaced by Raman Ha\u0142o\u016d\u010danka, a former head of the State Defense Industry Committee. Despite struggling with the effects of international sanctions for over four years\u2014measures that yielded only temporary results\u2014Belarus’ dependence on Russia has become critical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While \u0141uka\u0161enka occasionally criticizes Ha\u0142o\u016d\u010danka and even threatened to dismiss him, the prime minister\u2019s position remains stable. Ha\u0142o\u016d\u010danka is now the second-longest-serving prime minister, after Siarhiej Sidorski (2003-2010).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2020 was a crucial test for Belarus’ security chiefs, and many failed to demonstrate sufficient loyalty or ruthlessness. Interior Minister Juryj Karaje\u016d was replaced by Ivan Kubrako\u016d after he publicly apologized for the violent suppression of protests. \u0141uka\u0161enka also made significant changes to the leadership of the Committee for State Security (KGB), the Investigative Committee, and the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office: Valeryj Vakul\u010dyk was replaced by Ivan Tertel, Ivan Naskievi\u010d by D\u017amitryj Hara, and Alaksandar Kaniuk by Andrej \u0160vied.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In September 2020, Andrej Ra\u016dko\u016d was dismissed as state secretary of the Security Council and replaced by Alaksandar Valfovi\u010d. Earlier, Leanid Anfima\u016d was replaced by Vasil Hierasima\u016d as head of the State Control Committee.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Defense Minister Viktar Chrenin is the only security chief to keep his job without any career setbacks, likely because the army played a smaller role in suppressing the protests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka expressed frustration that his generals were not ruthless enough during the unrest. While some were fired, like Rumas, others were simply reassigned to less prominent roles, such as regional assistants, ambassadors or positions within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, Mika\u0142aj Karpianko\u016d, former head of the Main Directorate for Fighting Organized Crime and Corruption, was promoted in November 2020 to deputy interior minister and commander of the Internal Troops after overseeing brutal attacks on peaceful protesters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Non-security agencies also reshuffled<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In 2020, \u0141uka\u0161enka also reshuffled agencies not directly involved in maintaining security. For instance, he sacked the information minister after a poor performance by the state-controlled media in competition with independent news outlets. He also appointed Anatol Markievi\u010d\u2014an individual with no qualifications in culture\u2014as the new culture minister, tasked with purging dissent within the industry. Additionally, he replaced the ministers of health, finance and emergencies, as well as top regional officials. Siarhiej Chamienka, a loyalist with no legal training, was appointed justice minister two years ago.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Officials are chosen not for their expertise, but for their loyalty and obedience. A prime example is Siarhiej Kaval\u010duk, a former officer in \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s security service, who has served as minister of sports since 2018. Under Kaval\u010duk, Belarusian sports have seen a catastrophic decline, with national teams setting negative records at the Olympics. Since Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Belarusian athletes have been banned from many international competitions. Despite these poor results, Kaval\u010duk remains the longest-serving sports minister, primarily because of his success in purging dissenters within the sports sector.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n\n Belarusian ruler presenting state awards to generals on February 23\n <\/div>\n \n
\n (\u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s website)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s dependence on his entourage<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In the four years since the protests, \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s government has undergone a total reshuffle to ensure greater loyalty to the leader who has ruled Belarus for over thirty years. Most ministers, including both security chiefs and \u201ccivilian\u201d figures like Alaksiej Bahdana\u016d, responsible for price controls, and Andrej Ivaniec, tasked with managing ideology in education, are expected to stay in their posts for the foreseeable future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At first glance, the situation may seem stable: \u0141uka\u0161enka has survived the 2020 crisis and is surrounded by a team of loyal, battle-tested officials who are ruthless toward his enemies. However, loyalty often comes at the expense of competence, and the longer these officials remain in power, the more it becomes clear that \u0141uka\u0161enka’s stability depends on his growing reliance on his entourage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The problem with this situation is evident in the lack of professionalism. While state television channels and government officials boast of economic success, it\u2019s clear that this success hinges almost entirely on Moscow\u2019s support. Meanwhile, the Belarusian economy is overheating, the rubel is weakening, and the government is struggling to control inflation. To avoid further economic fallout, officials are discussing the need to abolish price caps.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some observers speculate that \u0141uka\u0161enka has scheduled the presidential election for January 2025, fearing that the economy will be in crisis by then. His reshuffling of personnel serves to prevent the formation of powerful factions and to ensure that security chiefs do not become too independent or conspire against him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s growing dependence on his loyalists is more pronounced than ever. After all, it was the hardliners who ensured his survival in 2020, and he feels a sense of obligation to reward them. He often refers to them as \u201chis men\u201d in government meetings, and even those who have failed in their roles are not dismissed but simply reassigned to less important duties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This shift has made \u0141uka\u0161enka less demanding of his officials, treating them with more leniency and kindness\u2014a sign of mutual dependence. Ultimately, however, the talent pool at his disposal is far smaller than he would like, and the longer his regime persists, the more dependent he becomes on his entourage\u2019s loyalty, even if it means compromising on competence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Between Moscow\u2019s grip and multivector illusion<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Interdependence in itself is not necessarily a problem, but for \u0141uka\u0161enka, who is deeply suspicious and sees threats everywhere\u2014including from his Russian ally\u2014this arrangement is fraught with peril. Moscow has never fully respected Belarus\u2019 sovereignty and continually seeks to influence officials in Minsk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Experts are correct to note that Moscow\u2019s patronage makes \u0141uka\u0161enka uneasy. While economic support from Russia is crucial, it comes with significant political costs, particularly in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is why \u0141uka\u0161enka has made overtures to the West, occasionally playing the role of a peacemaker by releasing political prisoners selectively and praising US President-elect Donald Trump\u2019s promise to stop the war\u2014directly contrasting with the Kremlin\u2019s rhetoric. He may still believe that cultivating ties with the West could ease his dependence on Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this regard, he likely misses the diplomatic acumen of the late U\u0142adzimir Makiej. However, with Belarus\u2019 relations with the West damaged beyond repair, even Makiej would have struggled to repair those ties, and his successors are far less capable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The foreign ministry stands as an exception to \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s trend of keeping ministers in place for extended periods. Siarhiej Alejnik was dismissed after just eight months, and his successor, Maksim Ry\u017eanko\u016d, is barely managing to cope.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After 2020, Belarus’s foreign policy has devolved into bizarre engagements, such as exotic visits to North Korea, while tensions with the West remain high.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka has tightened his grip on power, but his international isolation and growing dependence on Russian President Vladimir Putin remain his most pressing concerns.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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