{"id":119347,"date":"2024-12-23T10:01:14","date_gmt":"2024-12-23T07:01:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/119347\/"},"modified":"2026-04-15T13:35:32","modified_gmt":"2026-04-15T13:35:32","slug":"putin-tightens-russias-military-grip-on-belarus","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/119347\/","title":{"rendered":"Putin tightens Russia\u2019s military grip on Belarus"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In 2024, Belarus became even more reliant on Russia. Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka invited Moscow to deploy Russian weaponry to bolster his regime\u2019s stability, further cementing his country\u2019s role as the Kremlin\u2019s military outpost. Reducing this dependence will be a major challenge after \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s rule.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n (Sputnik Belarus)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

On December 19, during a televised call-in show in Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russia \u201cwill do everything in its power to ensure the security of Belarus.\u201d He emphasized that this is an integral part of Russia\u2019s updated nuclear strategy. The Kremlin is prepared to use nuclear weapons to defend the \u0141uka\u0161enka regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This strategic military alliance is designed to keep Belarus within Russia\u2019s sphere of influence, regardless of any future changes in government. Minsk may find it difficult in the future to force Moscow to withdraw its nuclear weapons and military bases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russian military presence<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The long-term Russian military presence in Belarus includes the Volga early-warning missile radar station, located eight kilometers east of Hancavi\u010dy, Brest region, and a submarine communication center near Vilejka, Minsk region. Moscow can quickly deploy troops to Belarus, as it did during its attack on Kyiv in February 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Bie\u0142aruski Hajun monitoring group reports that Russian troops are stationed at airfields in Baranavi\u010dy, Mazyr and Ziabra\u016dka. On December 6, \u0141uka\u0161enka and Putin signed an agreement on mutual security guarantees. BelPol, an opposition investigative center, claims that it authorizes Russia to establish additional military bases and deploy troops in Belarus in response to \u201cexternal aggression.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Security guarantees<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to BelPol, the treaty stipulates that Belarus and Russia must provide each other with military, military-technical and other forms of assistance if there is a threat to sovereignty, territorial integrity, external borders, or constitutional order. As a result, the Kremlin can demand \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s support if Russian territories\u2014such as Kursk province or the four occupied Ukrainian regions that Moscow considers part of the Union State\u2014are threatened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although Putin has not made such a demand yet, he is entitled to do so under the treaty. During the Wagner Group rebellion in June 2023, \u0141uka\u0161enka claimed that he was ready to send a brigade to Moscow to assist Putin. He was presumably referring to the Viciebsk-based 103rd Detached Guards Air Assault Brigade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Constitutional order<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The treaty also provides for mutual assistance in defending the constitutional order, meaning the current regimes in both Moscow and Minsk\u2014an arrangement that suits \u0141uka\u0161enka perfectly. Even before the treaty, Moscow had been ready to intervene in Belarus during mass protests against electoral fraud in August 2020. Putin said that Russia had formed a reserve of law-enforcement officers who could intervene under the Collective Security Treaty Organization or Union State mandate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now, the legal framework makes it easier for the two dictators to support each other. If \u0141uka\u0161enka is threatened, Russian troops could intervene swiftly. With Russian military bases already in place, suppressing protests would be even easier.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nuclear weapons<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka has claimed that Belarus hosts Russian tactical nuclear weapons, which he can use at will, and has requested that Moscow deploy Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles in his country. However, Russia\u2019s nuclear doctrine\u2014described by Putin as central to Belarus\u2019 defense\u2014stipulates that only the Russian president has the authority to decide on the use of nuclear weapons, though \u0141uka\u0161enka may be informed about their readiness or use. Thus, his role in this regard is limited.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Alaksandar Valfovi\u010d, the state secretary of the Belarusian Security Council, falsely claimed that \u0141uka\u0161enka has \u201ca red button of his own.\u201d According to Pavel Podvig, an expert at the UN Institute for Disarmament Studies, a Russian military unit must guard the storage facility for tactical nuclear weapons, if they are indeed stationed in Belarus. This mission is typically assigned by the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Defense Ministry. Therefore, access to nuclear warheads remains under Moscow’s control, and \u0141uka\u0161enka cannot use them independently.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia has supplied Belarus with nuclear-capable Iskander missile systems and has upgraded Belarusian Su-25 attack aircraft to carry nuclear warheads. Belarusian troops have been trained in Russia to handle nuclear munitions. While the Belarusian Armed Forces, under \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s command, could theoretically launch tactical nuclear weapons, it is important to note that actual control of these weapons lies with Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the future, Russia may deploy nuclear missiles in Belarus and use them without \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s approval.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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