{"id":120113,"date":"2024-12-30T10:25:09","date_gmt":"2024-12-30T07:25:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/120113\/"},"modified":"2024-12-30T10:25:11","modified_gmt":"2024-12-30T07:25:11","slug":"lukasenka-seeks-major-role-in-global-politics","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/120113\/","title":{"rendered":"\u0141uka\u0161enka seeks major role in global politics"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Belarus remains highly susceptible to Russian influence, which significantly shapes its foreign policy. Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka has made a concerted effort to assert his legitimacy on the global stage. Furthermore, his regime has never been more dependent on external developments, particularly the outcome of the war in Ukraine.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n (Oleksandr P \/ pexels.com)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Belarus\u2019 foreign policy crisis was highlighted by the appointment of Maksim Ry\u017eanko\u016d as foreign minister. His predecessor, Siarhiej Alejnik, failed to mend relations with the West and did not succeed in reaping economic benefits from \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s visits to Asia and Africa. Under Ry\u017eanko\u016d, the foreign ministry has become more of a propaganda arm, with the new minister adopting a more aggressive anti-Western rhetoric.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dependence on Russia<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Russia accounts for about 65 percent of Belarus\u2019 foreign trade. Additionally, approximately 20 percent of Belarusian exports pass through Russian territory. Economist D\u017amitryj Kruk noted that Russian economic support contributes up to 10 percent of Belarus\u2019 budget revenue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka maintains tight control over his country\u2019s domestic policies, but he has ceded much of Belarus\u2019 foreign and military policies to Moscow. Russian President Vladimir Putin\u2019s two visits to Belarus this year were marked by threats directed at the West, including implications of military actions launched from Belarusian soil. In May, the two leaders discussed the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. In December, \u0141uka\u0161enka and Putin also discussed the deployment of Oreshnik missiles, with Moscow promising to send them to Belarus in the second half of 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia treats Belarus as a military stronghold, and Europe similarly perceives it as such, often denying Belarus the agency to assert itself. \u0141uka\u0161enka is uncomfortable with this, and he is attempting to assert his independence, even in the realm of Russian weaponry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n\n Putin presents \u0141uka\u0161enka with the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called at the Kremlin on October 9\n <\/div>\n \n
\n (Screenshot: video from the unofficial Telegram channel of \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s press office)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka steers clear of direct involvement in Russian war<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Although \u0141uka\u0161enka has avoided direct involvement in the Russian war in Ukraine, he has been unable to prevent Russian drones from entering Belarusian airspace. Earlier this year, Minsk attempted to establish communication channels with Kyiv in hopes of mediating peace talks. However, these efforts faltered after Ukrainian troops crossed into Russian territory and captured part of the Kursk province. \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s image as a potential peacemaker has been undermined by his increasingly aggressive rhetoric in support of Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Global South pivot setbacks<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Belarus has continued its strategic shift toward the East and the Global South by joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and gaining BRICS partner status.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n\n \u0141uka\u0161enka during his visit to Zimbabwe (2023)\n <\/div>\n \n
\n (\u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s press office)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

However, these efforts have encountered significant setbacks. Trade with China fell by 37 percent in the first seven months of the year, with potash exports dropping by half. Beijing has expressed concern that Minsk\u2019s strained relations with the West could hinder China\u2019s ability to use Belarus as a gateway to Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite this, \u0141uka\u0161enka and other Belarusian officials have ramped up anti-Western rhetoric on international platforms, such as the SCO, BRICS, and the UN. Foreign Minister Ry\u017eanko\u016d even visited North Korea this year, a country with which Minsk had previously shown little interest in cooperating, largely due to the lack of economic benefits. Now, with Russia strengthening its alliance with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Belarus is eager to join this axis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka frequently casts himself as a spiritual leader of the Global South, but his influence remains limited. Many nations in this group are cautious about confronting the West and remain wary of Belarus\u2019 alignment with Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overtures to West<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Minsk\u2019s relationship with the West has been volatile. On one hand, Belarus has faced increasing isolation, with Poland considering closing the remaining border crossings. In response, Minsk has threatened its neighbors with Russian weaponry. On the other hand, Belarusian officials have signaled a readiness to engage with the West. Since July, \u0141uka\u0161enka has pardoned more than 220 political prisoners, hoping that the West would reciprocate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka also sent a message to Donald Trump to congratulate him on his election as US president.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While officials claim Belarus is faring well under sanctions, the country’s ongoing hostility with the West is taking a toll. Most notably, Belarus cannot use the Baltic ports \u2014 often the shortest route \u2014 to ship goods to its customers, undermining its strategic location as a transit hub. Freight transits have dropped by 30 percent year on year due to sanctions, border closures and logistical disruptions. Of the 26 border checkpoints, only five remain operational, causing concern among Chinese officials.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka has made overtures to the West in an effort to ease tensions. His strategy seems to involve starting with the issue of political prisoners and then moving on to discussions about migrants and sanctions. However, these efforts have yielded little success. The West remains unresponsive, due to the mixed signals Minsk continues to send, including its continued support for Russia’s war against Ukraine and its escalating anti-Western rhetoric.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lack of legitimacy<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The primary challenge facing \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s regime in 2025 is establishing himself as a legitimate participant in any future peace talks on Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Trump has made ending the war a top priority. However, genuine peace can only be achieved if a new security framework for Eastern and Central Europe is negotiated \u2014 one that involves Russia, Ukraine, the United States and the “collective West.” Belarus could play a role in these talks due to its central location.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the West does not recognize \u0141uka\u0161enka as a legitimate leader and views his regime as a puppet of Russia. \u0141uka\u0161enka is hoping that the January presidential election will resolve his legitimacy issue before peace talks begin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He is banking on the fact that his regime\u2019s participation in peace talks will help shield Belarus from both Russian and Western influence. Russia has fully supported his involvement in these talks, but Kyiv opposes it, as stated by special envoy Ihor Kyzym. The West is also skeptical of his role.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The war\u2019s stalemate could be followed by prolonged negotiations, which may further weaken Ukraine, while Belarus risks becoming more isolated, caught behind the “iron curtain” that divides Russia from the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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