{"id":125809,"date":"2025-02-11T13:36:11","date_gmt":"2025-02-11T10:36:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/125809\/"},"modified":"2026-04-15T13:35:32","modified_gmt":"2026-04-15T13:35:32","slug":"zelenskys-caution-about-belarus-involvement-in-war-should-be-taken-seriously","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/125809\/","title":{"rendered":"Zelensky\u2019s caution about Belarus\u2019 involvement in war should be taken seriously"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned last week that Russia may intensify its efforts to draw Belarus into its war against Ukraine.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Zelensky\u2019s concerns<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

On February 5, Zelensky made this statement in Kyiv during a briefing after meeting with UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy. He urged Western partners to strengthen their defenses, warning that Putin may target other countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“Maybe Poland will be next, or the Baltic states. . . . I don\u2019t know if there will be an invasion, but in any case, he will drag Belarus into the war,\u201d Zelensky said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cYou will see him deploying forces to Belarus in the spring, summer, or autumn. Many Europeans, maybe even the USA, will call it intimidation. It is intimidating to Poland, Lithuania and other Baltic partners.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russian troops are expected to arrive in Belarus for the Zapad-2025 exercise in September. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense has said that over 13,000 troops will participate, though it has not specified how many soldiers will come from Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pavie\u0142 \u0141atu\u0161ka, a Warsaw-based Belarusian opposition politician, has warned that as many as 40,000 troops could be involved, but he did not provide evidence to support his claim.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The figures released by Belarusian and Russian officials can hardly be trusted, just as their statements of intent. Prior to the Union Resolve 2022 exercise, officials falsely claimed that the maneuvers were non-aggressive and did not exceed the thresholds set out in the Vienna Document (9,000 troops, 250 tanks, 500 armored vehicles, and 250 artillery systems).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Later, \u0141uka\u0161enka admitted that 20,000 Russian troops attacked Ukraine from Belarus in February 2022, while Ukrainian sources cited even larger numbers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2022, Ukrainian forces managed to push the invading troops out of northern Ukraine. A new Russian offensive from Belarus would likely require a larger force, which the Kremlin currently cannot mobilize. A shortage of cannon fodder has forced Moscow to resort to North Korean mercenaries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While officials may exaggerate the scale of the Zapad-2025 exercise, Moscow lacks the manpower and resources for a fresh invasion from the north. Moreover, Ukraine is better prepared now: fortifications have been built, mines have been planted, and US satellites are tracking troop movements near the border.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, despite \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s dependence on the Kremlin, he is reluctant to send Belarusian soldiers into the war. He made this clear to Moscow during the early stages of the invasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While Putin could potentially force \u0141uka\u0161enka to deploy Belarusian troops, the Russian leader is unlikely to risk losing his last ally now that the \u201cspecial military operation\u201d seems to be going well for Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unlike North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, \u0141uka\u0161enka is not prepared to sacrifice his soldiers, as he fears public protests. The Belarusian population is opposed to the country\u2019s direct involvement in the war, and even in the current repressive climate, it may revolt if soldiers’ caskets start arriving from the front lines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

War is unpredictable, especially with the potential involvement of US President Donald Trump, whose efforts to end the conflict could have the opposite effect.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This forecast is based on the current situation, but by September, when the Zapad-2025 exercise takes place, circumstances could change significantly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka too weak to attack NATO<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Zelensky\u2019s statement has sparked speculation. Ukrainian political analyst Kyrylo Sazonov suggested that if the conflict were to freeze, Putin might attack Poland or the Baltic states with \u0141uka\u0161enka’s help.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He noted that Russia would avoid direct engagement, using Belarus as a scapegoat and forcing the West to negotiate with the Kremlin as a \u201cpeace broker.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This theory seems far-fetched. \u0141uka\u0161enka is not capable of attacking NATO on his own: he has neither the desire nor sufficient combat-ready forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka is known for exaggerating his army\u2019s strength. In February 2023, he claimed that the Belarusian army had 75,000 troops during peacetime, but independent experts estimate the actual number, including civilian staff (14,000\u201315,000) and cadets, is closer to 49,000.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Among them, only the special operations forces (4,000\u20136,000) are relatively well-trained, but they lack combat experience. The army\u2019s equipment is largely outdated, despite regular upgrades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If \u0141uka\u0161enka were to clash with NATO, his forces would likely be quickly defeated. Additionally, Poland would block Chinese railway transit through Brest, pitting Beijing against Minsk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka is unlikely to engage in a war with NATO, even with Putin\u2019s backing, due to public opposition and fear of the West\u2019s response.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Kremlin lacks the resources for another act of aggression in 2025. While a ceasefire in Ukraine remains uncertain, Russia seeks to avoid a new mobilization, and its arsenal is depleted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even if Russia and Belarus were to capture the Suwa\u0142ki Gap, as some fear, NATO forces could easily crush the invaders with artillery and airstrikes. To succeed, the attackers would need to capture the Baltic states, leading to another major war\u2014something Moscow is not prepared for at present.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some commentators point out that in 2022, many observers underestimated Putin\u2019s resolve. However, recklessness does not equate to boundless opportunities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2022, Putin made a mistake by relying on intelligence reports that assured him Ukrainians would welcome Russian forces with open arms. However, he holds no such illusions about the Poles or the Baltic nations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The threat from the Kremlin to Europe still exists, but there is no need to panic. Zelensky\u2019s statement should not be interpreted as an expert prediction but rather as political rhetoric intended to rally the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka subdued by Kremlin\u2019s military push<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Kremlin has militarily subdued Belarus and is now institutionalizing this process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On February 5, Putin submitted a bill to the Russian State Duma for ratifying an agreement on security guarantees within the Union State, which would allow Russia to establish military bases in Belarus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Previously, \u0141uka\u0161enka resisted Moscow\u2019s efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus. In 2015, he rejected Russia\u2019s proposal to set up an airbase in Babrujsk and refused to recognize Crimea as Russian territory, enabling him to play the role of a peacekeeper and host a Normandy Four meeting in Minsk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now, however, he seems unable to refuse Putin\u2019s demands.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Notably, the security agreement includes provisions that may offer \u0141uka\u0161enka some confidence, as Moscow promises to defend Belarus, including with nuclear weapons if necessary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka takes pride in the potential deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil, along with the possible stationing of the Oreshnik system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Kremlin\u2019s nuclear umbrella and economic aid are the pillars supporting \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s regime, but this does not mean Moscow is concerned about his future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Russian leadership, maintaining a strategic foothold in Belarus is crucial, regardless of who governs the country. The presence of tactical nuclear weapons and potential future military bases strengthens Belarus\u2019 role in Russia\u2019s geopolitical strategy and serves as a tool for blackmailing the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Will this blackmail escalate into a real conflict? That remains an open question, and much depends on negotiations between Putin and Trump over Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, a prolonged cold war scenario is quite likely, especially after a potential redistribution of global spheres of influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In that case, Belarus would remain fully under the Kremlin\u2019s control, and the iron curtain between the two autocracies and the West may persist for many years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is clear that \u0141uka\u0161enka, in his bid to hold onto power, has become Putin\u2019s pawn. A military alliance with an aggressive empire, the stationing of its weapons in Belarus, and the potential establishment of bases is not a guarantee of peace, as propaganda suggests, but rather a significant risk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At some point, Moscow may indeed pull Belarus into a military conflict, and this scenario should not be ruled out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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