{"id":138893,"date":"2025-05-20T12:17:48","date_gmt":"2025-05-20T09:17:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/138893\/"},"modified":"2025-05-20T12:17:50","modified_gmt":"2025-05-20T09:17:50","slug":"polands-presidential-race-holds-no-promise-for-minsk","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/138893\/","title":{"rendered":"Poland\u2019s presidential race holds no promise for Minsk"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Poland is a parliamentary republic, where the prime minister wields significantly more power than the president. President Andrzej Duda, from the right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS), has held office since 2015 and is now nearing the end of his second and final term.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n\n Rafa\u0142 Trzaskowski speaking at a campaign rally in Mi\u0119dzyrzecz on May 14\n <\/div>\n \n
\n (Trzaskowski's social media)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

In the first round of the presidential election, Warsaw Mayor Rafa\u0142 Trzaskowski, representing the ruling centrist Civic Coalition, secured 31.2 percent of the vote, according to the National Electoral Commission. He was followed closely by right-wing candidate Karol Nawrocki, who garnered 29.7 percent. Of the 13 candidates, Trzaskowski, Nawrocki, and S\u0142awomir Mentzen of the Confederation of Freedom and Independence were considered to have realistic chances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The outcome of the runoff will likely hinge on who can attract the supporters of far-right candidate Mentzen, who received 14.8 percent in the first round.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The election is widely viewed as a key test for the ruling coalition, which is represented by the Warsaw mayor. If Trzaskowski wins, Prime Minister Donald Tusk would gain an ally in the presidency, potentially increasing his government\u2019s leverage. In contrast, a Nawrocki presidency would serve as a counterweight to the powerful cabinet. Observers suggest that Nawrocki would likely make more frequent use of his right to propose and veto legislation than Duda did, potentially slowing the legislative process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some fear that a standoff between the cabinet and the president could trigger a political crisis and even lead to early parliamentary elections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

No pro-Russian sentiment, Ukraine still central<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Despite growing pro-Russian sentiment in parts of Europe, Polish politicians\u2014regardless of their political affiliation\u2014avoid pandering to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In much of Europe, far-right politicians tend to express sympathy for Vladimir Putin\u2019s Russia and challenge the principles of liberal democracy. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orb\u00e1n is widely regarded as the EU\u2019s most pro-Russian leader. In Romania, hard-right Eurosceptic George Simion was recently defeated in the presidential election. Meanwhile, Germany\u2019s far-right Alternative for Germany came in second in the February elections and now holds a record number of seats in parliament.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Populist Czech politician Andrej Babi\u0161, often accused of echoing Russian narratives, is seen as a potential security risk. Political tensions are escalating in Czechia ahead of a crucial election this autumn, which could dramatically shift the country’s foreign policy and bring it closer to a Kremlin-sympathizing bloc that includes Hungary and Slovakia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Paradoxically, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, a Kremlin sympathizer and Eurosceptic, heads a Social Democratic government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For historical and other reasons, pro-Russian sentiment remains low in Poland\u2014a fact that politicians are keenly aware of. Both the ruling Civic Coalition and the opposition PiS view Moscow as Poland\u2019s chief geopolitical adversary. Even Mentzen avoided pro-Russian rhetoric during his campaign to maintain broader support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ukraine continues to feature prominently in the Polish election debate, though more from a domestic than an international perspective. Polls show that Polish voters are growing weary of the ongoing war in Ukraine and increasingly concerned about the millions of Ukrainian refugees in Poland. In response, candidates have promised to cut social support for Ukrainian immigrants and reduce related budget spending. Interestingly, Belarusian immigrants\u2014Poland\u2019s second-largest migrant group\u2014have not been mentioned in the debate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belarusian propaganda: between two evils<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

For Minsk, the Polish presidential election offers little hope. Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka had expressed cautious optimism ahead of Poland\u2019s 2023 parliamentary election, hoping that the Donald Tusk government would prompt a shift in Polish policy. That hope has not been realized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The change of government in Warsaw has brought no tangible benefits to the Belarusian regime, nor has it altered the situation for Belarusian exiles in Poland. Polish officials continue to meet with Belarusian pro-democracy leaders, criticize \u0141uka\u0161enka, call for the release of imprisoned ethnic Polish journalist Andrzej Poczobut and strengthen defenses along the eastern border.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This presidential election is unlikely to alter the status quo in Polish-Belarusian relations, which is why it receives limited coverage in Belarusian state media. On May 12, the state-run BelTA<\/em> news agency ran a headline describing the election as a choice \u201cbetween two evils.\u201d The agency portrayed Polish voters as struggling to make ends meet and pay their bills.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In reality, the phrase \u201cbetween two evils\u201d reflects the Belarusian authorities\u2019 perception of the runoff between Trzaskowski and Nawrocki, not that of Polish voters\u2014who remain under no illusions about the nature of the Belarusian dictatorship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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