{"id":139920,"date":"2025-05-26T15:39:00","date_gmt":"2025-05-26T12:39:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/139920\/"},"modified":"2026-04-15T13:35:32","modified_gmt":"2026-04-15T13:35:32","slug":"thirty-years-without-a-border-cost-of-belarus-russia-integration","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/139920\/","title":{"rendered":"Thirty years without a border: cost of Belarus-Russia integration"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

It has been 30 years since Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka of Belarus and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin held a ceremony at the Belarusian-Russian border to formally eliminate border controls.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n\n Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka of Belarus and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin removing a symbolic border barrier between Belarus and Russia on May 26, 1995\n <\/div>\n \n
\n (Belarusian leader's press office)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Lack of infrastructure<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Belarus and Russia had no physical border infrastructure when they were part of the Soviet Union. Even after both governments agreed to scrap border controls in 1995, proper infrastructure was still lacking. Russian President Boris Yeltsin declined Minsk\u2019s invitation to attend the ceremony.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On-and-off promises<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

During the early years of his rule, \u0141uka\u0161enka was a fervent advocate of integration, often proclaiming his readiness to go \u201cas far as Moscow wishes to go.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In December 1999, he signed a union treaty with Russia, which called for establishing a joint parliament, a common constitution and a monetary union\u2014measures many saw as a disguised plan to incorporate Belarus into Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Observers speculated that \u0141uka\u0161enka hoped to lead a united state. However, those ambitions were thwarted when Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin as his successor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2002, Putin revived the topic of Belarus\u2019s annexation, rejecting \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s requests for economic concessions and instead inviting Belarus to join Russia as six federal provinces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By then, \u0141uka\u0161enka had turned Belarus into his personal fiefdom and was unwilling to surrender sovereignty. He blocked Russian proposals for a monetary union and resisted further integration efforts that threatened his control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moscow, frustrated by \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s failure to follow through on his promises, responded by increasing prices for natural gas and crude oil, restricting access to Russian markets for Belarusian dairy products and sugar and launching information campaigns against the Belarusian leader.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Kremlin also sought to acquire key Belarusian assets, including the Minsk-based truck and bus manufacturer MAZ and the Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant, which produces transporter erector launchers and other heavy-duty military vehicles. \u0141uka\u0161enka flatly rejected the MAZ acquisition, saying, \u201cI will not approve such an act of banditry.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2009, he warned officials that Moscow aimed to absorb Belarus:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThey have conceived a big game. If we hold out, we\u2019ll have a state. If not, they\u2019ll crumple us up and put us in their pocket for free. And then we\u2019ll be running around, looking right and left, begging for a slice of bread thrown from their table.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whenever relations soured, \u0141uka\u0161enka often accused Russia of harboring imperialistic ambitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Persistent integration efforts<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

When direct overtures failed, Russia shifted to alternative formats of integration, such as the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Yet despite these initiatives, both sides continue to protect their own markets. Notably, the allies have so far failed to implement common markets for oil and gas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka insisted that, following the establishment of the EEU, Russia should supply natural gas to Belarus at domestic Russian prices, specifically matching those in the Smolensk province. Russian officials retorted that Belarus would need to become a Russian province to qualify for such discounts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2018, the Kremlin demanded \u201cdeeper integration\u201d in exchange for continued subsidies, but \u0141uka\u0161enka refused to sign the proposed \u201cintegration roadmaps.\u201d Tensions simmered for 18 months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In March 2020, \u0141uka\u0161enka ridiculed Russia\u2019s decision to partially close the border with Belarus due to the COVID-19 pandemic:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIt is strange that no one in the Russian government knows that Belarus and Russia have no border. It has not been delimited or demarcated. We have no border\u2014there is nothing to close.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless, Russian border guards soon set up checkpoints, causing long queues of vehicles and disrupting cross-border movement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Arrest of Russian militants<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In July 2020, Belarusian security forces arrested 33 Wagner Group fighters near Minsk on suspicion of plotting a mutiny ahead of the presidential election. The detainees were charged with planning a terrorist attack.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Following the arrests, Security Council State Secretary Andrej Ra\u016dko\u016d said that around 200 militants were hiding in Belarusian forests, with two more groups assembling near Pskov and Nevel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although the detainees were eventually released, the incident exposed the anxiety among Belarusian authorities before the election. Minsk suspected Moscow of planning to interfere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka can hardly trust Moscow now, especially after being forced to submit to Putin during the mass protests against electoral fraud in 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Kremlin also coerced him into supporting Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2023, \u0141uka\u0161enka invited thousands of Wagner mercenaries to Belarus following Yevgeny Prigozhin\u2019s failed mutiny. The move escalated tensions with Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An iron curtain has now descended at Belarus\u2019s borders with its western neighbors\u2014a direct consequence of the open border with Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russian military presence<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The abolition of border controls has had dire consequences for Belarus. \u0141uka\u0161enka originally pursued integration with grand ambitions, hoping to outmaneuver Moscow. But it proved to be a grave miscalculation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By opening the gates, he allowed the spread of the “Russian world.” Today, Russia is methodically chipping away at Belarusian sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pro-Russian propaganda dominates the Belarusian media. Illegal migrants transit through Russia to Belarus, from where they attempt to breach the borders of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia\u2014countries that accuse Minsk of aiding hybrid warfare against the EU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russian troops move freely into Belarus, treating it like home territory. The Kremlin uses Belarus as a launchpad to threaten Ukraine with nuclear weapons and Oreshnik missiles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In February 2022, Russia used Belarusian territory to launch a large-scale offensive toward Kyiv. \u0141uka\u0161enka later claimed he learned of the invasion from the media.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the BelPol intelligence group has revealed evidence showing that \u0141uka\u0161enka had prior knowledge of the planned operation and assisted Moscow in its preparations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He may have resented his role, but what choice did he have? Thirty years ago, he opened Pandora\u2019s box\u2014not just the border.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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