{"id":176100,"date":"2026-02-17T19:43:10","date_gmt":"2026-02-17T16:43:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/176100\/"},"modified":"2026-04-15T13:35:32","modified_gmt":"2026-04-15T13:35:32","slug":"moscow-pressures-lukasenka-to-reaffirm-loyalty-amid-fears-of-power-transition","status":"publish","type":"longreads","link":"https:\/\/pozirk.online\/en\/longreads\/176100\/","title":{"rendered":"Moscow pressures \u0141uka\u0161enka to reaffirm loyalty amid fears of power transition"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Alaksandar \u0141uka\u0161enka on February 16 defended his engagement with Washington during a meeting with Sergei Glazyev, secretary of the Union State, stressing that Minsk does not resolve its issues at Russia\u2019s expense. The Belarusian strongman reiterated his commitment to the alliance.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n (Pictures: White House, Kremlin, BelTA\/Pozirk's collage)<\/span>\n <\/div>\n <\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

\u201cNo force in the world\u201d can separate Belarus from Russia, he claimed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

His remarks followed a statement by Russia\u2019s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), which accused the West of seeking to weaken ties between Minsk and Moscow and to use Belarus\u2019 2030 presidential election to change the country\u2019s \u201cconstitutional system.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the same day, Mikhail Galuzin, a Russian deputy foreign minister, urged Minsk to exercise caution in its dealings with Washington.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cautious signal from the Kremlin<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Galuzin stated that despite lifting sanctions on Belarus\u2019 Bie\u0142aviaja airline, the US administration \u201chas not yet given up on its policy of pressure on Byelorussia.\u201d In effect, he warned Minsk against making excessive concessions to the United States while negotiating what both sides describe as a \u201cgrand bargain\u201d \u2014 the release of political prisoners in exchange for sanctions relief.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moscow may be irritated that \u0141uka\u0161enka has managed to find common ground with Washington \u2014 something the Kremlin itself has struggled to achieve.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Not surprisingly, the SVR named US agencies and foundations as the primary forces allegedly plotting to democratize Belarus, despite the fact that the administration of Donald Trump significantly reduced global funding for democracy promotion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russian intelligence services are undoubtedly aware of this contradiction. Nevertheless, they fear that a grand bargain between Minsk and Washington could reduce \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s dependence on Moscow, while the Kremlin seeks to maintain full leverage over its ally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Responding to Moscow\u2019s warnings, \u0141uka\u0161enka emphasized his political experience, asserting that he could teach others \u2014 including the Russians \u2014 how to \u201cdeal with this wild West, of which the United States is the main part.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Gaza board: opportunity and risk<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Kremlin may also be displeased with \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s swift decision to accept Trump\u2019s invitation to join the Board of Peace for Gaza, while Vladimir Putin remains hesitant. Putin, who spoke with \u0141uka\u0161enka by phone on February 8, may have advised him against traveling to the United States for the board\u2019s inaugural meeting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Belarus will instead be represented by Foreign Minister Maksim Ry\u017eanko\u016d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although \u0141uka\u0161enka denied receiving any advice from Putin, he has a well-known tendency to reject claims he prefers not to acknowledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For \u0141uka\u0161enka, participation in the Board of Peace resembles a rose garden \u2014 full of sweet-smelling opportunities to engage Washington in negotiations, yet lined with thorns that could easily wound him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He appears unwilling to make substantive political concessions, but he must offer something in return for the invitation and Trump\u2019s diplomatic overtures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka assured Glazyev that he would discuss Belarus\u2019 participation with Putin: \u201cMaybe Vladimir Vladimirovich\u2019s arguments will change my position, or maybe he will hear something new from me.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cWe are seriously determined to work on the Board of Peace \u2014 as seriously as possible \u2014 not to flatter anyone, not to adapt to anyone, but to take a stance, a sovereign stance,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He added that he intends to attend future board meetings personally and even suggested he could advise Trump on dealing with Venezuela.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThey carried out some kind of operation, captured a man. So what? They showed the whole world who\u2019s who. And most importantly \u2014 what next? I have suggestions on how to get out of this situation. And if they want to resolve it with dignity and grace, we are ready to work with Donald Trump in this regard.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite the Kremlin\u2019s warnings, \u0141uka\u0161enka appears eager to seize the opportunity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moscow\u2019s anxiety over succession<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

It is easy to understand why Moscow is wary of \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s outreach to Washington. It is less clear why it is so focused on the 2030 election, which remains several years away.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is unlikely that the Kremlin genuinely fears, as the SVR suggests, Western efforts to recruit \u201cnew liberal activists\u201d to stage another color revolution. \u0141uka\u0161enka remains acutely aware of that risk and continues to maintain a high level of repression to prevent a repeat of the events of 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

More plausibly, the Kremlin is concerned about an eventual transition of power in what it considers its strategic outpost.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u0141uka\u0161enka is aging, even if he has reportedly improved his health. The SVR statement may therefore serve as a signal to \u0141uka\u0161enka and his inner circle that any succession plan must receive Moscow\u2019s approval.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Kremlin may believe that \u0141uka\u0161enka\u2019s son Mika\u0142aj lacks sufficient experience, or it may harbor reservations about Viktar. More broadly, Moscow likely fears that a future leader could pursue liberal reforms and deeper engagement with the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By raising the issue now, the Kremlin appears to be establishing a principle: any future ruler in Belarus must have Moscow\u2019s consent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Specter of a manufactured crisis<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

As for the threat of a color revolution, Russia has demonstrated its capacity to manufacture pretexts when necessary. A local incident \u2014 real or staged \u2014 could be used to justify intervention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For example, Moscow could claim that extremists are attempting to seize Russian nuclear munitions or Oreshnik missiles stationed in Belarus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It could then orchestrate a controlled vote similar to the referendum held in Crimea in 2014, potentially installing a compliant leader or even initiating a referendum on Belarus\u2019 accession to Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whether the West could or would prevent such a scenario remains an open question \u2014 one that merits separate analysis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What is clear is that Russia\u2019s fixation on \u201chistorical lands\u201d and the restoration of lost greatness poses a profound challenge to Belarusian sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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