“If Russia makes a deal with the United States, Europe and Ukraine will be utterly finished,” Alaksandar Łukašenka said after talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on March 13. The statement reflects his opposition to democratic ideals. Meanwhile, Kyiv and the European Union are indeed in a very vulnerable position.
Łukašenka, Putin strengthen ties amid crisis
After the Belarusian government suppressed protests in 2020, Belarus’ chances for democratization and closer ties with the EU faded significantly. The country fell almost completely under the Kremlin’s control.
Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian onslaught somewhat dented Łukašenka’s confidence in 2022 as Minsk’s relations with the West collapsed, and sanctions for his complicity in the aggression hit the economy.
However, the sanctions failed to weaken Russia or Belarus substantially. Moreover, Minsk and Moscow have benefited from Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election. To fulfill his promise to end the war, the US president has been putting pressure on Ukraine, the side more dependent on Washington.
At the news conference, Łukašenka warned that the Kremlin might be reluctant to agree to a ceasefire because Ukrainian forces were retreating. Putin did not outright reject a 30-day ceasefire plan but said many details needed to be worked out.
Łukašenka seeks gains as Moscow pressures Ukraine
Now that Ukrainian forces have retreated from Russia’s Kursk province, a ceasefire would not suit Putin. By placing conditions on it, he seeks to drag out the resolution, strengthen his position, and eventually issue his ultimatum for Kyiv.
Łukašenka also stands to benefit from any deal unfavorable to Ukraine. Most importantly, he expects rewards from the Kremlin for his commitment to the alliance with Russia.
He is hoping for a reset with the United States, possibly followed by his recognition by Europe.
He also aims to profit from rebuilding Ukraine. “There’s nothing left there, and Europe won’t help them,” he said on March 13.
Łukašenka is emboldened and already trying to dictate his terms to the West. Noting that Putin intends to negotiate “considering the situation on the ground,” he said: “We can apply this military thesis to our civil field. If [Western partners] return, here are the conditions. . . . You’re welcome to come. But, as Vladimir Vladimirovich said, ‘We’ve learned a lot during this time.’”
Łukašenka respects United States, despises Europe
Commenting on the EU’s plans to spend 800 billion euros on rearmament, he quipped in his familiar rude manner: European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (who served as Germany’s defense minister from 2013-2019) “has probably never seen modern weapons like missiles; she has never even seen a normal handgun, but is already thinking globally about weapons and organizing a European army.”
Following his talks with Putin, he said that “in the negotiations between Russia and the USA, these two hold the future of Europe, which has acted recklessly. . . . But most importantly—giving more false promises, they won’t be able to fool us. We know our goals and our interests.”
Łukašenka has upgraded his status from a gracious host simply willing to host talks to the Kremlin master, referring to himself and Putin as “we.” He rightly points out the rift in the EU and the reluctance of EU residents to spend heavily on armaments. Europe indeed faces a massive challenge, and it is still unclear whether it will cope with it.
Against this backdrop, Belarus can fade into the background, widely seen as a province of Russia. An iron curtain is likely to descend between the EU and the alliance of two autocracies. Belarusian opposition politicians will find it harder to convince their European counterparts that Belarus is not Russia.
Łukašenka remains a piece on Kremlin’s chessboard
The two regimes demonstrate a mutually beneficial symbiosis. In Moscow, Łukašenka emphasized that Belarus manufactures transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicles for Russia’s Oreshnik ballistic missile systems to be stationed in Belarus. “From the ‘big brother’ [Russia], we will only need the missiles.”
Pozirk has not been able to verify his claim. The Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant (MZKT) has long been producing TEL vehicles for Russian missile systems. Attempts by Russia’s KamAZ to design its own TEL for these systems have so far yielded no significant results.
Belarusian industry has been integrated into the Russian military-industrial complex. In February, Łukašenka visited the Minsk-based Integral chip plant, which was given a second lease on life thanks to orders from the Russian defense sector.
The Łukašenka administration’s newspaper reported, “Many things we saw here can be shared with the public. Too many secret technologies and products, including for military purposes.”
Obviously, these products are exported to Russia. Some analysts say that if the war in Ukraine ends, demand for Belarusian military goods may decrease.
On February 21, Łukašenka expressed fear of Western companies returning to Russia. If the United States and Russia strike a deal to improve relations, American and European companies may return to Russia, creating tight competition.
On the other hand, observers note that if Moscow and Kyiv sign a peace deal, Putin will not abandon his plans to capture Ukraine. He might also try to attack Europe, weakened by the NATO crisis.
Therefore, Moscow is likely to continue building up its military power, so Belarusian services will remain in demand.
A week ago, Łukašenka supported Russia’s proposal to build a plant in Belarus for producing unmanned aerial vehicles with a capacity of up to 100,000 units per year. Although the chairman of Russia’s Competence Center for Unmanned Aerial Systems, Yury Kozarenko, said that the plant would be focused on producing agricultural drones, it is logical to assume that Moscow also has other uses in mind.
The symbiosis of the two regimes currently demonstrates its viability and mutual benefit. Although Moscow has clout over Belarus, Sviatłana Cichanoŭskaja’s warning that Belarus might end up as a consolation prize for Putin now seems irrelevant. First, what consolation? The Kremlin is set to grab large swaths of Ukraine. Second, why would Putin need to annex Belarus if Moscow already fully controls it?
The country’s formal independence even benefits Russia. Belarus is an extra vote in the United Nations and a staging ground for hybrid wars against Europe.
Thus, it is not a consolation prize but rather a deal to divide spheres of influence, in which Moscow has every chance of becoming the main beneficiary.
Trump to speak to Putin
Although Putin spent much time with Łukašenka on March 13, negotiations with US special envoy Steven Witkoff, who took the ceasefire plan to Moscow, were much more important for him. On board his presidential plane, Air Force One, on March 16, Trump announced to reporters that he would be speaking to Putin on March 18.
On the talks with Putin, Trump said: “I think we’ll be talking about land. It’s a lot different than it was before the war, as you know. We’ll be talking about power plants, that’s a big question. But I think we’ve already discussed a lot of it already by both sides, Ukraine and Russia. We’re already talking about that, dividing up certain assets, and they’ve been working on that.”
