For years, Belarus’ foreign economic policy has relied on gray routes, vague hubs and geopolitical uncertainty that made it possible to conceal real trade flows. Now that same uncertainty—concentrated around the new war involving Iran and the Persian Gulf—is turning against Minsk.
The regime finds itself squeezed between conflicting partners. Old schemes are no longer working, and there are neither the resources nor the time to quickly rebuild them.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is Belarus’ main partner in the Persian Gulf, according to data declared by Minsk. Although the Belarusian government has classified trade statistics by country, state media reported that at the end of 2024 annual trade with the UAE amounted to $3.7 billion, with Belarusian exports reaching $3.66 billion.
These figures were announced in a report on a meeting between Alaksandar Łukašenka and the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Chairman of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council Sheikh Khaled bin Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in June 2025 in Minsk.
For the domestic audience, these indicators were presented as a clear success of the “pivot to the East,” at a time when relations with Europe are at their lowest point.
However, the UAE Ministry of Economy reported that non-oil trade with Belarus amounted to just $585.7 million in 2024. Moreover, the volume declined from $668.5 million in 2023.
The mismatch between the official figures may indicate the presence of gray schemes.
The Belarusian side might have included trade in oil and petroleum products in its statistics, using the UAE—along with other front countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia—to circumvent sanctions by declaring false origins of goods and redistributing shipments.
Belarus operates a whole gray network of such routes. After all, statistics in Minsk and statistics in Abu Dhabi are not obliged to match.
Under current conditions, such discrepancies are bad news for Minsk. The United States and its partners have for several years steadily increased pressure on sanctions-evasion schemes, tightening control over maritime transport, insurance, payments and logistics hubs.
The conflicts in the Middle East, catalyzed by the American-Israeli attack on Iran, have affected the Belarusian economy and propaganda in a peculiar way.
For Minsk, Iran is a role model: resilient despite decades of sanctions. Despite international criticism of its tight control over society and brutal repression, the Iranian regime has been able to bargain with the outside world.
However, the Donald Trump administration appears determined to crush it. Minsk has therefore found itself in a precarious position. Although the Belarusian government formally sticks to its anti-Western rhetoric, it still seeks at least limited improvement in relations with Washington—hoping to ease sanctions and use the United States as a counterweight to Russia.
As a result, the regime’s usual aggressive propaganda increasingly takes on the character of phantasmagoria. While demonstrating hostility toward the West, Minsk tries to avoid mentioning the United States directly; while expressing condolences over the death of Iran’s leader, it remains silent about who killed him.
At the same time, Minsk does not appear particularly concerned about how the Kremlin views such ambiguity. In fact, Minsk understands that Moscow itself experiences similarly contradictory feelings toward Washington.
This is precisely why the conflict knot around Iran—where the interests of the United States, the Persian Gulf countries, Israel, Russia, China and other players intersect—becomes a source of frustration for Belarus.
On the one hand, Minsk sees the Middle East as a major opportunity to bypass sanctions and channel gray flows. On the other hand, it must choose a camp—and choosing a camp could destroy this very opportunity.
For the regime’s survival, the Belarusian economy has for years been built around small shady deals and schemes rather than a coherent development strategy. Re-exports, shadow logistics routes, front companies used to conceal the origins of goods, and the skillful use of regulatory loopholes—all of this has become the norm.
The goal is simple: survive today, while the future remains secondary. Over time, this logic has effectively turned into a long-term strategy within which both the Belarusian economy and the Belarusian elites operate.
This model functioned perfectly in a world of uncertainty. Any turbulence—war, conflict, or regime change—opened additional opportunities.
But today Belarus finds it increasingly difficult to profit from external turbulence. Moreover, the regime has neither the resources nor the time to quickly and effectively build new routes and schemes. Officials cannot even determine where to move next—uncertainty now works against them.
Bitter tensions with the West prevent Łukašenka from expanding Belarus’ presence in Western markets, particularly the European one. The EU is a predictable market with clear rules, easy transit, legal protections, institutions and partners guided by laws and contracts rather than situational arrangements.
Now, after the government placed its bet on turbulence, it has become clear that the uncertainty that once worked in Minsk’s favor can also work against it.
Suddenly, Western markets—whose loss Belarus seemed to have compensated for and whose sanctions damage it claimed to have minimized—look attractive and desirable again.
Repeating the claim that the West will freeze without Russian energy and become poorer as a result of a new wave of turbulence is unlikely to help. EU countries have already experienced similar crises and adapted to them quite effectively.
Belarus, however, faces the consequences of such turbulence for the first time. This is no longer a kind of chaos from which one can profit, but chaos whose consequences must be managed without freedom of maneuver and without sufficient reserves of strength.
And so Belarusian officials must now be scratching their heads.
